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Corporate Voting versus Market Price
Setting
Yair Listokin, Yale Law School
This paper examines the relation between two means of corporate information
aggregation—corporate voting and stock market pricing. If the median voter and the
price-setting shareholder share similar information, then close proxy contest outcomes
should not have systematic effects on stock prices. The paper shows, however, that
close dissident victories cause positive movements in stock prices, while close man-
agement victories lead to negative price effects. The median voter values management
control more than the price-setting shareholder. Voting and market pricing aggregate
information in very different ways, with important implications for the role of voting
and market pricing in corporate law. (JEL D71, G14, G34, K22, P5)
1. Introduction
Corporations have two primary means of aggregating dispersed infor-
mation and making decisions—voting and price setting. When shareholders
vote on a merger or in a contested director election (two examples of “proxy
I thank Lucian Bebchuk, Alan Gerber, Henry Hansmann, Daniel Ho, Stephanie Lis-
tokin, Ian Masias, Roberta Romano, Benjamin Sachs, Alan Schwartz, two anonymous
referees, the editor (John Donohue), and seminar participants at Stanford Law School,
University of California Berkeley Law School, University of Pennsylvania Law School,
the University of Virginia Law School, and Northwestern Law School for extremely help-
ful comments and discussions and the Oscar M. Ruebhausen Fund for financial support.
All errors are my own.
Send correspondence to: Yair Listokin, Associate Professor of Law, Yale Law School,
PO Box 208215, New Haven, CT 06520-8215 USA; Telephone: 203-436-2567; Fax:
203-432-4570; E-mail: yair.listokin@yale.edu.
American Law and Economics Review
doi:10.1093/aler/ahp015
Advance Access publication October 23, 2009
C© The Author 2009. Published by Oxford University Press on behalf of the American Law and Economics
Association. All rights reserved. For permissions, please e-mail: journals.permissions@oxfordjournals.org.
608







Corporate Voting versus Market Price Setting 609
fights”), they aggregate diffuse opinions through voting; the corporation pur-
sues the outcome favored by the holders of a majority of shares. Given the
power of the vote, it is no surprise that Delaware courts describe corporate
voting as “fundamental.” Corporations also receive feedback from diffuse
investors through stock prices. When price-setting shareholders support a
company’s actions, the price of the company will rise. Indeed, the market’s
ability to aggregate diffuse information into prices forms the basis for all
event studies.
Critics of corporate voting argue that it is a deeply flawed aggregation and
decision-making mechanism. The critics say that voting is expensive, unduly
favors management, and fails to generate efficient outcomes (Bebchuk, 2005,
2007). Majority voting privileges the median shareholder’s opinion over
the opinion of other shareholders. Market pricing also has its detractors,
with critics arguing that the market focuses on short-term outcomes to an
excessive degree, thereby inducing myopic behavior from managers (Lipton
and Savitt, 2007).
This paper evaluates these two information aggregation mechanisms from
an empirical perspective. More specifically, I estimate how the price-setting
shareholder perceives the decisions of the median voter in a corporate elec-
tion. I do this by examining stock market responses to the announcement of
the outcomes of close votes. The stock market response to close votes has
two desirable attributes for measuring the price-setting market participant’s
view of the median voter’s opinion. First, the outcome of close votes is
uncertain. The announcement of a vote outcome provides information to the
price-setting shareholder by resolving this uncertainty. I can evaluate the
price-setting shareholder’s view of the information by observing the stock
market response to the information.
Second, close votes suggest that the median shareholder/voter is nearly
indifferent between the two voting options in a proxy contest. The median
voter in a proxy contest is the shareholder in the exact middle of a ranking
of voters along the dimension of preference for one side (e.g., “existing
management”) in a proxy contest. If shareholders vote for management
so long as they prefer management and the vote is a perfect tie, then the
median voter is exactly indifferent between management and “dissidents.”
If the vote is not a perfect tie but closely favors existing management, then
the median voter slightly prefers the winning option, but is relatively “close”
to indifference.
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The market response to close votes in proxy voting contests is striking
(see Figure 5). In close elections—when the median voter should be nearly
indifferent regarding either outcome—the price-setting shareholder is far
from indifferent. Stock price responds systematically to the announcement
of vote outcomes. When management wins a close election, market value
declines; when a dissident wins, the value rises.
I conclude that the price-setting shareholder places lower value upon
management control of companies than the median voter. I then examine
the implications of this finding for corporate voting and market pricing. I
argue that the results either indicate a systematic management advantage
in the voting process or a serious flaw in the underpinnings of corporate
voting or market pricing. If price-setting shareholders provide a reasonably
accurate gauge of value (a proposition that underlies every event study) and
value maximization is the goal of corporate law (as most assume)—then the
results suggest the need for serious corporate voting reforms.
This paper proceeds as follows. Section 2 discusses existing studies of
proxy contests. Section 3 develops a framework for analyzing stock market
responses to voting outcomes. Section 4 presents the data and Section 5
empirically examines the stock market response to proxy voting outcomes.
Section 6 examines the implications of these findings for assumptions re-
garding corporate voting and stock market pricing. Section 7 examines
possible policy responses and concludes.
2. Empirical Studies of Proxy Contests
The impacts of proxy contests on corporate direction and value have
been investigated from several perspectives. Pound (1988) examines the
probability of winning proxy contests as a function of a number of firm
characteristics. For example, widely dispersed shareholders should impede
dissidents from mounting and winning proxy contests because dispersion
increases the costs of campaigning—costs that are not reimbursed to dissi-
dents whenever dissidents fail to win the contest. Pound’s data support this
hypothesis; dissident victory rates decline as ownership dispersion rises.
Unfortunately, many of the characteristics examined by Pound are endoge-
nous to the probability of winning, casting doubt on Pound’s conclusions.
For example, shareholder ownership may be more dispersed in firms that are
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less likely to benefit from dissident proxy victories. In this case, dissidents
will be less likely to win proxy contests with dispersed share ownership,
even if management enjoys no vote-getting advantage.
Other studies (Dodd and Warner, 1983; DeAngelo and DeAngelo, 1989;
Ikenberry and Lakonishok, 1993; Mulherin and Poulsen, 1998; Brav et al.,
2007) evaluate the stock market responses to proxy contest announcements
or the involvement of an activist shareholder (such as hedge funds), finding
generally positive effects. Proxy contest announcements, however, may af-
fect value in many ways, such as forcing management to change policies or
signaling to the market that informed market participants believe that a firm
has potential. As a result, these studies do not provide (nor do they aim to
provide) information about the relationship between the information aggre-
gation via corporate voting and information aggregation via market pricing.
Similarly, Kamar’s (2006) examination of voting on mergers and acquisi-
tions provides evidence on the degree to which companies avoid holding
votes. Kamar’s study tells little about the relation between value maximiza-
tion and voting outcomes because management may prefer to avoid proxy
votes even though management enjoys systematic advantages in the voting
process.
Alexander et al. (2008) (see also Choi et al., 2008) focus on stock market
responses to the announcement of proxy advisor recommendations.1 They
find that a dissident recommendation from ISS—the largest proxy advisor– is
associated with a statistically significant increase in market price. While the
result is an important one, it again tells little about the relationship between
voting and price-setting. When a proxy advisor issues a recommendation,
the market receives many pieces of information, including information about
the probability of each side winning as well as information about the desir-
ability of each side. A dissident recommendation, for example, “certifies”
a dissident as credible. In response, the price-setting market participants
may respond positively even if they believe that the company has greater
value in the hands of management; the “downside” of a dissident victory
in the minds of the market participants is improved by the certification.
Therefore, stock market responses to proxy announcements or proxy vote
1. See Alexander, Cindy R., Mark A. Chen, Duane J. Seppi, and Chester S. Spatt’s
2008 unpublished paper, “The Role of Advisory Services in Proxy Voting.”
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recommendations are not informative about the relationship between the
median shareholder/voter and price-setting shareholder.
This paper applies a different methodology—focusing on the outcomes
of close votes—to evaluate the impact of vote outcomes on abnormal stock
returns.2 As explained below, this design addresses many of the critiques of
the event study methodology employed by the previous papers.
3. Median Voters and Price-Setting Shareholders
As the previous section demonstrated, endogeneity concerns, baseline
problems, and data limitations hinder tests of the congruence between voting
(and in particular the median voter) and stock market price setting. By com-
bining empirical methodologies, this section attempts to derive such a test.
3.1. Close Votes and the Median Shareholder Voter
First, each shareholder/voter, j of a large pool of shares J, with rights
to vote in a proxy contest receives a signal about the value of the com-




 j = V jD − V jI . Assume that a shareholder/voter votes for a dissident if
and only if  j ≥ 0. The median voter, m ∈ J is the shareholder/voter for
whom #{ j ∈ J :  j ≥ m} ≥ J2 and #{ j ∈ J : m ≥  j } ≥ J2 .4 This im-
plies that a tie vote means that m ≈ 0; if the median voter prefers in-
cumbents to dissidents, then the median voter, as well as some shareholder
voters with  j ≤ m will vote for the incumbents. When this occurs, the
assumption that the vote is a tie is contradicted. A symmetric argument
applies if the median voter prefers the dissident to the incumbent. Thus,
the median voter must be nearly indifferent when the vote is a tie. When
2. Regression discontinuity designs have been applied in finance papers in recent
years, for example, Rauh (2006), Roberts and Chava (2007), but they have not been applied
to the problem of cross sectional abnormal return regressions such as those described by
MacKinlay (1997).
3. Each shareholder may derive these values independently (according to a person-
alized signal), as in the “Condorcet” voting model, (Young, 1988) or these values may be
calculated strategically—each voter may calculate what these values are assuming that
they are the decisive vote (Feddersen and Pesendorfer, 1997; Gilson and Schwartz, 2001).
4. The median voter’s vote is decisive in a majority voting system. Hence, this paper
examines the efficacy of “corporate voting” by focusing on the median shareholder/voter’s
preferences.
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the number of shareholders is large and the variance of  j is limited, then
the median voter will have only a slight preference for one side or the other
whenever the vote is nearly a tie.
3.2. Close Votes and Market Responses
Assume that there is some set of market participants (“price-setting share-
holders”) who set prices.5 Let V psI be the price-setting shareholder’s val-
uation of the corporation with an incumbent management victory and let
V psD be the valuation of the corporation when there is a dissident victory.6
Suppose that the price-setting shareholder estimates the probability of an
incumbent management victory, αI . The price set by the price-setting share-
holder(s) before the announcement of a vote is PBV = αI V psI + (1 − αI )V psD
and the price after the announcement of an incumbent management victory
is PAV = V psI and after a dissident victory, the price is PAV = V psD . The
market response to the announcement of an incumbent victory, PI , is
PAV − PBV = (1 − αI )(V psI − V psD ) and the response to a dissident victory,
PD = PAV − PBV = αI (V psD − V psI ).
3.3. Predictions
This analysis of median shareholder/voters and price-setting shareholders
yields several predictions. Prediction 1. If the median voter and the price-
setting shareholder have the same valuations, then there should be no stock
price response to the announcement of a tie vote. To see this, recall from
Section 3.1 that a tie vote implies that the median voter is nearly indifferent
5. If stock demand is perfectly horizontal, then all shareholders set the price, which
equals the present discounted value of earnings of the company. If all participants share
common beliefs, however, then this begs the question of why shareholder voting would
be split. Consequently, it appears more reasonable to assume differences in shareholder
opinion (e.g. Harris and Raviv, 1993). In the Harris and Raviv model (pp. 482–3), one
shareholder type constitutes the set of price setting (or marginal) shareholders. “Market
pricing” tracks the opinions of this set of shareholders. Thus, evaluation of market pricing
is closely related to tracking the preferences of price-setting shareholder. For a similar
model emphasizing the role of a price-setting shareholder, see Alexander, Cindy R., Mark
A. Chen, Duane J. Seppi, and Chester S. Spatt’s 2008 unpublished paper, “The Role of
Advisory Services in Proxy Voting.”
6. More precisely, V psI = (V psI |I  D) and V psD = (V psD |D  I ), where A  B
denotes that option A defeated B in a vote. This reflects the possibility that the price-
setting shareholder uses the vote totals and outcomes to update valuation beliefs about
incumbents and dissidents, respectively.
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between management and incumbents, V mD − V mI = m ≈ 0. If the price-
setting shareholders have the same valuations of management and incum-
bents as the median shareholder, then V psD − V psI = V mD − V mI = m ≈ 0,
so PD ≈ 0 and PI ≈ 0. Analogously, close votes—those that are near
ties—should have relatively mild stock price responses when the median
voter and the price-setting shareholder have similar or identical valuations.7
Now, suppose that the valuations of the median voter have no relation to
the valuations of the price-setting shareholder. Under these assumptions, the
magnitude of the stock market response to a vote outcome depends upon the
price-setting shareholder’s view of the likelihood of that outcome occurring.
Thus, PD ∝ αI , the more the price-setting shareholder expects incumbents
to win, the greater the stock price response to a dissident victory and the
lower the response to an incumbent victory. Moreover, the dispersion of
price responses should be the highest where αI ≈ 0.5.8
Prediction 2. If price-setting shareholder valuations are not equivalent
to median voter valuations and the set of close votes has a large intersection
with the set of votes where αI ≈ 0.5, then the magnitude of stock price
responses to close votes should be larger than the responses to other votes.
It should be emphasized, however, that αI for the price-setting share-
holder is not observable. While a rational price-setting shareholder will
presumably have the most uncertainty when the observed vote is close, so
that there is considerable overlap between the set of close votes and the set
of votes for which αI ≈ 0.5, this overlap is not guaranteed. At times, the
price-setting shareholder will expect a close vote (αI ≈ 0.5) but the eventual
vote outcome will not be close—management’s share of the vote will be
considerably greater or less than 50%. In these circumstances, there may be
a large stock price response to a vote that is not as close as the price-setting
shareholders’ expectation. Alternatively, some votes that are actually close
may not have been expected to be close—αI is not near 0.5. These votes
will be close but will not always result in large price responses. Under these
7. If the median voter and price-setting shareholder have the same valuation and
the price-setting shareholder knows this, then the price-setting shareholder will know
the outcome of the vote before it is announced. I therefore assume that price-setting
shareholders have some uncertainty about the valuation of the median voter.
8. The stock price response is a binomial random variable that can take value PD
with probability αI and value −PD with probability 1 − αI . The variance of a binomial
is proportional to αI (1 − αI ), which is highest where αI = 0.5.
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conditions, the average close vote will have a larger stock price response
that is more informative about the price-setting shareholders valuation,
(V psD − V psI ), than the average lopsided vote. Some (unexpectedly) lopsided
votes will have strong price reactions, however, while some (unexpectedly)
close votes will have small reactions even if (V psD − V psI ) is significantly
different from zero. Thus, Prediction 2—that stock price responses should
be largest to close votes—should be true on average rather than in all cases.
Another complication to this framework concerns the results of
Listokin (2008). That paper discovered that management frequently wins
a vote on a management-sponsored proposal by a close margin, but sel-
dom loses by a similarly narrow amount. The price-setting shareholder
may therefore expect management to win a disproportionate number of
close votes. As a result, votes decided by narrow margins are not viewed
as toss-ups (αI ≈ 0.5) by the price-setting shareholder, but rather as
contests likely to go management’s way (αI > 0.5). Under these as-
sumptions, Prediction 3a will hold—the magnitude of stock market re-
sponses to close elections should be asymmetrical. For a given (V psD − V psI ),
narrow dissident victories, which are unexpected, should have a larger
stock market response than narrow management victories, which are more
expected. |PD| = αI (V psD − V psI ) > |PI | = (1 − αI )(V psI − V psD ) for a
fixed (V psD − V psI ) when αI > 0.5. Moreover, (Prediction 3b), the asymme-
try in responses to management and dissident victories should be particularly
large for votes that are close but not extremely close; when a dissident wins
by a relatively wide margin, it may contain considerable new information
for the market, since price-setting shareholders, knowing that management
is likely to win the close ones, will only expect an outcome toss-up (αI ≈
0.5) when the dissidents have a voting support advantage that offsets man-
agement’s advantage in close votes.
All of these predictions will be examined empirically in the following
sections.
4. Proxy Voting Data and Summary Statistics
4.1. Data and Summary Statistics
Georgeson Shareholder’s list of proxy contests in its Annual Corporate
Governance Report from the years 2000 through 2006 constitutes the starting
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point for my data collection. For each proxy contest listed by Georgeson
that was decided by vote,9 I collect voting data—the date of a vote as well as
votes received by both management and dissidents—from each company’s
public filings, most commonly a 10-Q or 8-K filing for the appropriate
time period. This data were combined with stock market data from CRSP,
supplemented by data from Yahoo! Finance for three stocks traded on the
pink sheets markets.10 The sample includes all companies in the Georgeson
reports with available stock market data and voting data.
There are ninety-seven contested proxy votes in the sample. The year
2001 witnessed the greatest number of votes (twenty-two), while 2005 had
the fewest (seven). Eight of the proxy votes concerned merger approvals (a
tiny fraction of total U.S. mergers and acquisitions activity) and seventy-four
concerned director elections (again, a tiny fraction of the number of director
elections over the period). The remaining fifteen contests concerned assorted
topics such as confidential voting or the adoption of cumulative voting, with
no issue being the subject of more than three votes. Dissidents won thirty-
seven of the ninety-seven proxy votes, for a success rate of 38%.
The average market value for the companies in the sample is approxi-
mately $1.47 billion, while the median market value is $130 million—the
average is raised by the presence of several companies worth over
$10 billion. The tenth percentile of market value is roughly $30 million.
Most proxy contests are competitive.11 Figure 1 presents a histogram
of the percentage of votes received by management in the proxy contests.
Management receives an average of only 53% of the necessary vote in
proxy contests and over half of the contests were decided by margins of
under twenty percentage points. This competitiveness is not surprising;
because dissidents must expend their own funds on proxy contests, it makes
little sense to commence a proxy contest with little chance of winning.
9. A number of proxy contests climax in a settlement between the dissident and
management. Because the outcome of these settlements is hard to characterize both
practically and chronologically, these observations are excluded from the analysis. In
addition, some contests concern more than one issue. For these contests, I focused on
the issue that would have the greatest consequences for the company, such as a contested
director election rather than a new bonus plan for management.
10. Excluding the pink sheets stocks does not substantively affect the estimates
presented below.
11. This starkly contrasts with votes on management-sponsored proposals, which are
overwhelmingly lopsided. See Listokin (2008).
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Figure 1. Management Votes Shares for Proxy Contests Listed in
Georgeson Shareholder’s Annual Corporate Governance Report of
2000–2006. The figure reports results for all proxy contests that went to a
vote and for which data were available from SEC filings. This data are the
vote share data used in all future figures and tables.
In addition, most proxy contests involve high turnout as a percentage of
total shares outstanding. In the median contest in the sample, over 78% of
shares were voted. As a result, it is unlikely that close results are caused by
indifference, such as when management gets to a threshold that it knows it
needs and stops accumulating votes.12
The appropriate calculation of vote percentage presents a complication.
While the number of votes in favor of management is clear (the percent-
age’s numerator), the denominator used to calculate the percentage varies
by issue based on state default law and corporate charter amendments. For
example, an agreement to be acquired by or merge with another company
must be supported by 50% of shares outstanding,13 while approval of the
acquisition of a smaller company (when such approval is required) generally
12. Listokin (2008) demonstrates that arriving at a vote threshold and stopping is
quite unusual even when there is not high turnout.
13. 8 Del. C. § 251(c), § 271(a). (In the contested merger contests (which are most
likely to have deviations from state default law) the requisite percentage was verified.
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needs only 50% of votes cast.14 Directors are elected by plurality rules.15
Throughout the paper, the denominator applied to calculate the percentage of
votes received by management depends on the requirement for management
success. To illustrate, consider a company with 1000 shares. At an annual
meeting following a proxy contest, 450 votes are cast in management’s favor
on some issue while 350 votes are cast against. If the issue is approval of
a merger, management failed to gain approval, since it needs a majority of
shares outstanding (at least 501 votes). In Figure 1 (and all other figures
and regressions), management’s vote percentage is therefore presented as
45% = 450/1000. If the issue is a director election, however, then manage-
ment’s slate will have won, as it has received over 56% = 450/800 of votes
cast. This outcome will be presented as management receiving 56.25% in
Figure 1 and other figures.
Figure 1 also relates to previous research on management’s ability to
disproportionately succeed in close elections. Listokin (2008) demonstrated
that management wins very close corporate votes (those decided by mar-
gins of no more than 10%) far more often than management loses. Figure 1
similarly demonstrates a disproportionate management win rate (eighteen
wins in twenty-six chances) in proxy contest voting. If we assume that man-
agement wins and losses in close votes (votes where management receives
more than 40% but less than 60% of the votes) are truly toss-ups that should
be binomially distributed (Gerber and Malhotra, 2008), then a distribution
as favorable to management as the one observed in Figure 1 should occur
randomly less than 4% of the time.16
The disproportionate management win rate observed in Figure 1 is less
pronounced than the management win rate observed in Listokin (2008).
The discrepancy in management win rates between Figure 1 and Listokin
(2008) is likely related to differences between the two samples of votes
under study. Listokin (2008) examines votes on all management proposals.
Many such proposals have one-sided proxy solicitation—by management
14. 8 Del. C. § 216(2).
15. 8 Del. C. § 216(3).
16. Defining votes between 40% and 60% as toss-ups is arbitrary, of course. If we
restrict the characterization of toss-ups to votes between 45% and 55%, then the probabil-
ity of randomly obtaining the management win rate observed in Figure 1 becomes 27%.
Small sample sizes prevent a conclusive determination that management disproportion-
ately wins the close votes examined in this paper.
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but not by opponents of management’s proposal. In the disputed proxy
contests examined in Figure 1 and the remainder of the paper, however, the
dissidents are sufficiently invested to incur the expense of a proxy contest
and may well have hired their own solicitors for last minute lobbying. This
may reduce, but does not appear to eliminate, management’s advantage in
close votes.
4.2. Empirical Methodology
As developed in the theoretical section, the market response to close elec-
tion outcomes yields important information about the relative valuations of
median voter and price-setting shareholders with respect to management
control versus dissident control. Instead of running a standard event study
that suffers from the flaws described in Section 2, I apply a regression dis-
continuity (RD) design (Imbens and Lemieux, 2007).17 This constitutes a
variant of the “cross sectional” abnormal return methodology (MacKinlay,
1997), in much the same way that RD generally constitutes a variant of
standard cross-sectional regression. Regression discontinuity analysis seeks
to uncover the causal effect of assigning a particular treatment (in this case,
a dissident victory) on an outcome (in this case, firm value). The RD de-
sign assumes that expectations of victory and other company characteristics
are similar on average for companies that receive similar levels of voting
support.18 For example, companies in which management receives 49.9%
of the vote should be similar (in terms of both expected vote outcomes
and company characteristics) to companies in which management receives
50.1% of the vote. While 49.9% companies may be similar in many di-
mensions to 50.1% companies, they differ in the treatment they receive. The
49.9% companies receive the dissident treatment while the 50.1% companies
receive the management treatment.19 Regression discontinuity examines the
17. Note that Table 2 presents regression results that follow a more standard event
study methodology, with very little change in results.
18. The RD design thus is not affected by correlation between firm characteristics
and the degree of anticipation of an event, a concern for other variants of cross-sectional
abnormal return methodology (Prabhala, 1997).
19. The RD design also mitigates “selection” concerns arising from the fact that
companies that have votes on proxy contests are different from companies that settle
proxy contests and very different from average companies. While there may be enormous
differences between companies with contested proxy votes and other companies, the
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changes in value for the two groups and asserts that differences in value are
the causal effect of management control versus dissident control.
Some evidence about the validity of the RD assumption is given in
Figure 2. If companies that narrowly win and lose votes are relatively similar,
the distribution of firm characteristics between the two groups of companies
should be similar. Figure 2 shows that companies that narrowly win and
narrowly lose proxy votes are of similar size, have similar institutional own-
ership percentages, and have relatively similar insider ownership shares,20
with no systematic discontinuities evident at vote shares around 0.5. Dis-
continuities around a vote share of 0.5 are also absent from noncontinuous
variables, such as the exchange on which companies are traded and their
industry.
McCrary (2007) explains that manipulation of the “running variable”
(in this case, management’s vote share) precludes simple causal inferences
in RD designs. Figure 1 demonstrates that manipulation of the vote share
is a possibility, as there are more close management victories than close
dissident victories. As a result, the RD estimates presented below cannot
be interpreted as providing a causal estimate of the impact of a dissident
victory on value. Instead, the RD estimates should be interpreted as an
estimate of the price-setting shareholder’s relative valuation of management
versus dissident control when the median voter is nearly indifferent between
the two sides, regardless of whether or not the median voter’s opinion has
been influenced in a nonrandom fashion.21
RD designs present results both graphically and analytically (Imbens and




E[Y | v = 50] − lim
v→50−
E[Y | v = 50],
difference between companies that both have votes where management receives similar
vote shares should be much smaller. The RD design identifies the impact of control
from small variations in votes received. It should be emphasized, however, that the
results presented below constitute local average treatment effects (LATE) estimates for
companies engaged in close proxy contests, rather than randomly selected companies
(Imbens, 2007).
20. One of the narrow management victories had an extremely high insider ownership
share.
21. Because the median voter is decisive in corporate majority voting, the median
voter’s indifference is relevant regardless of how that indifference is caused.
































































Figure 2. (a) Market Values Calculated from
CRSP Data on Shares Outstanding and Market
Price. For “pink sheets firms” (a total of three),
data were obtained from Yahoo! Finance. All the
remaining figures and tables use this market value
data. (b) Prevote Institutional Ownership and
Management Vote Share. Institutional ownership
data on companies with contested proxy votes
collected from Bloomberg Data Services. (c)
Prevote Insider Ownership and Management Vote
Share. Insider ownership data for firms with
contested proxy votes collected from Bloomberg
data services.
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where v is management’s vote share and Y is the change in market value.
These limits (and therefore τ) are estimated using a kernel regression design
with an Epanechnikov kernel approaching vote shares of fifty. Separate ker-
nel regressions are run when approaching a share of fifty from above and
below (Imbens, 2007).22 Standard errors for τ are estimated via bootstrap-
ping.
Several methodological questions remain. First, the “event” date on which
news of a proxy vote outcome is available to the market is ambiguous. The
study uses the day of a vote as the event date. This may not be accurate. While
most voting outcome announcements found in simple Internet searching are
announced on the day of the vote (the polls typically close in the morning
of the day of the annual meeting), some votes are announced after the day
of the vote. As a result, I use three-day abnormal returns to capture events
that are not incorporated into stock prices on the day of the vote. If the event
windows do not capture proxy outcome news, the study is biased toward not
finding any significant effects.
Second, different proxy issues are also likely to have different stock price
responses. Some of the proxy contests described in the Georgeson publi-
cations concern issues that have ambiguous implications for stock market
value, such as bylaw amendments or advisory votes. To focus on issues
that are likely to be important for value, the empirical analysis presented
below examines votes concerning contested mergers and contested director
elections. These contests are examined separately and as a single sample.
5. Stock Price Responses to Proxy Voting Outcomes
Table 1 and Figure 3 present stock market responses to contested proxy
voting outcomes about mergers and acquisitions. Merger proxy contests are
likely to be the extremely significant for corporate value. The results are
22. The Epanechnikov kernel weighting places greater weight on an observation
the closer it is to fifty. The weights go down in quadratic fashion as an observation’s
vote share diverges from fifty. Because the number of observations is limited, bandwidth
sizes are larger than they would be if data were more plentiful. Smaller bandwidth sizes
typically have almost no impact on point estimates, but raise standard errors. Bandwidth
and kernel shapes for local regressions are included in all tables. Standard event studies
can be viewed as a special case of regression discontinuities with infinite bandwidth and
a rectangular kernel.
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Table 1. Stock Price Responses to News of Proxy Contest Outcomes
Merger and
Merger Votes Director Elections Director Votes
τ(Limit of change in market
value when management
wins minus change in value
when management loses)
−0.083∗ (0.047) −0.059∗ (0.031) −0.069∗∗ (0.029)
Kernel Epanechnikov Epanechnikov Epanechnikov




Number of Observations 8 74 82
Notes: Standard errors are in parentheses.
∗∗∗P < 0.01, ∗∗P < 0.05, ∗P < 0.1.
RD estimates of differences in value between management and dissident victory as the vote share approaches
50%. The number of votes necessary to win each vote differs. Target votes on acquisitions generally require
supermajorities (e.g., two-thirds of votes shares outstanding or majority of shares outstanding). Acquirer votes on
acquisitions require a simple majority of votes cast. See, for example, NYSE Listed Company Manual, Sections
312.03, 312.07. The All votes cast estimates use normalized vote shares where the vote share is compared to the
number necessary for management to win. Bandwidths are chosen to balance bias versus variance. The more
observations, the smaller the bandwidth. See Deaton (1997) for details. Generally, smaller bandwidths have a
small impact on the point estimates (leaving them unchanged or raising them slightly, but raise standard errors).
striking. Dissident victories under study were not overwhelming victories;
management received almost 50% of votes cast in these votes.23 Therefore
the vote outcomes were likely both informative and controversial. The kernel
regression estimates that a management victory leads to an 8.3% decrease
in value, a result that is statistically significant at the 10% level in spite
of the paucity of observations. Moreover, the result is not the artifact of
one extreme case. The smallest positive abnormal return associated with
a dissident victory was over 4%. Management victories, by contrast, are
associated with zero to slightly negative abnormal returns.
Table 1 and Figure 4 present a similar but less pronounced story with
respect to director election proxy contests. The RD design estimates τ—the
difference between management and dissident victories in the limit ap-
proaching 50%—as approximately −6.0%, an estimate that is significant at
the 10% level. Figure 4 presents further graphical evidence that dissident vic-
tories are associated with increases (some of which are quite large) in stock
market value while narrow management victories lead to decreases in value.
23. Management lost the votes because they did not obtain a majority (or in one case
a supermajority) of the votes of shares outstanding.
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Management Vote Share
Figure 3. Stock Market Responses to Proxy Contest Outcomes
Regarding Mergers. Abnormal return calculated according to standard
event study methodology (MacKinlay, 1997) using a market model of
returns. Management vote share is calculated relative to the appropriate
denominator for each corporation. If a proposal must receive a majority of
shares outstanding to win, then the management vote share is calculated
relative to the number of shares outstanding. The management vote share
in these cases is therefore lower than it would be if it were calculated as a
proportion of votes cast. Each scatter point represents a particular proxy
vote and the subsequent abnormal return for the company’s stock. Each
line is a kernel regression using an Epanechnikov kernel and a bandwidth
of twenty.
Table 1 (column III) and Figure 5 combine director and merger votes in
one specification. The RD design provides an estimate of τ of −6.9%. This
result is statistically significant at the 5% level. Moreover, it is quantitatively
significant, suggesting that price-setting shareholders place considerably
higher value on dissident victories than on management victories.
The previous RD estimates used bandwidths that placed little weight
on observations that did not have extremely close votes. The theoretical
analysis presented above, however, provided several reasons to suspect that
stock price responses to more lopsided votes will also contain information
about the price-setting shareholder’s relative valuations of dissident and
management victories. Table 2 presents the results of a regression of three-
day cumulative abnormal returns on a dissident victory dummy variable for
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Management Vote Share
Figure 4. Stock Market Responses to Proxy Contest Outcomes
Regarding Director Elections. Management vote share is calculated
relative to votes cast. Each scatter point represents a particular director
election and the subsequent abnormal return for the company’s stock.
Each “line” is constructed via a kernel regression using an Epanechnikov
kernel and a bandwidth of five.
the sample of merger and director votes where the winning side received
less than 70% support compared to the relevant voting population.24 The
results support the estimates of Table 1. Dissident victories in these some-
what closely contested contests are associated with an approximately 7%
increase in stock market value relative to management victories. This result
is statistically significant at the 1% level and provides further support for
the notion that price-setting shareholders value dissident victories as 5–7%
more valuable in votes where the outcome is uncertain.
To examine whether this pattern persists over longer periods, Table 2
(columns 3 and 4) also presents the results of a regression of one-year
cumulative abnormal returns on a dissident victory dummy variable for the
24. The specifications in Table 2 therefore constitute “cross-sectional abnormal re-
turn regressions”—a variant of the standard event study methodology—as described in
MacKinlay (1997). The cross-section in Table 2 is limited to relatively close votes (where
the winning side receives less than 70% of the required voting population). All votes
meeting these criterion are weighted equally.
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Management Vote Share
Figure 5. Stock Market Responses to Merger and Director Election
Proxy Contests. Management vote share is calculated relative to the
relevant voting population. Each scatter point represents a particular vote
and the subsequent abnormal return for the company’s stock. Each “line”
is constructed via a kernel regression using an Epanechnikov kernel and a
bandwidth of five.
sample of merger and director votes where the winning side received less
than 70% support compared to the relevant voting population. The results
are inconclusive, as might be expected given the small sample size and wide
dispersion of abnormal returns over a one-year period. One-year abnormal
returns are positively correlated with dissident victories, though in ordinary
regressions (column 3) the impact of dissident victories is both smaller in size
(1.4%) and nowhere near statistical significance. Because the regression in
column 3 may be driven by outliers, column 4 presents a quantile regression
(at the median), which places less weight on outliers. In this regression, a
dissident victory has an estimated positive 7.8% impact on value, which is
consistent with the short-run estimates. Again, however, standard errors are
so large that the result is not statistically significant.
Figures 6 and 7 demonstrate that (with one or two exceptions) the change
in market values associated with close wins and close losses are generally
not caused by large changes in the net positions held by institutions or in-
siders (data on insider and institutional ownership come from Bloomberg).
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Table 2. Regression Results: Cumulative Abnormal Returns as a Function of
Dissident Victories in Relatively Closely Contested Contests
One-year
3 day One-year abnormal return,
COEFFICIENT abnormal return abnormal return median regression
(1) (2) (3) (4)
Dissident Victory 0.0712∗∗∗ 0.0139 0.0786
(0.0153) (0.115) (0.105)
Constant −0.0252∗∗ 0.0488 0.00669
(0.0100) (0.0743) (0.0683)
Observations 58 55 55
R-squared 0.279 0.0003 N/A
Standard errors in parentheses.
∗∗∗P < 0.01, ∗∗P < 0.05, ∗P < 0.1.
The sample examined in this table concerns all votes regarding mergers and directors where the winning side
received less than 70% of the relevant vote population. (All other tables and figures use all votes—even if they are
lopsided.) Column 2 presents results from a regression of three-day cumulative abnormal returns (the dependent
variable) on whether or not dissidents won the vote. Column 3 presents results from a regression of one-year
cumulative abnormal returns on whether or not dissidents won the vote. Because the results in column 3 may be
driven by outliers, column 4 presents quantile regression results (at the 50th percentile) for one-year abnormal
returns. All observations in each regression are weighted equally.
Institutional holdings of corporate shares generally rise regardless of whether
management or dissidents win the vote. Insider holdings also stay relatively
constant, although there are some cases of insider holdings rising consider-
ably after a decisive dissident victory.25
6. Prediction Testing
The theoretical framework developed in Section 3 made several differing
predictions regarding the stock market price response to close proxy contests.
The differing predictions stemmed from different assumptions regarding the
nature of shareholder voting and market price setting. If a prediction proves
false then this provides strong evidence that the assumptions behind the
prediction are incorrect.26 If a prediction holds true, then this provides
25. One explanation for insider holdings rising after decisive management losses is
that the identity of the insider has changed, perhaps because large shareholders have
retaken direct control of a company from management.
26. Falsehood of the prediction proves falsehood of the assumptions via the contra-
positive result.
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Figure 6. Change in Institutional Ownership Share and Management
Vote Shares. The change in institutional investor ownership is calculated
by subtracting the institutional ownership share in the quarter before the
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Figure 7. Change in Insider Ownership Share and Management Vote
Share. The change in insider ownership is calculated by subtracting the
insider ownership share in the quarter before the vote from the insider
ownership share in the quarter after the vote.
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evidence, but not conclusive evidence, that the assumptions behind it are
true. This Section reviews the performance of the various predictions.
Prediction 1. If the median voter and the price-setting shareholder
have the same valuations, then there should be a small stock price re-
sponse to the announcement of the outcome of a close vote. This prediction
fares extremely poorly. As Figures 3–5 demonstrate, close votes are often
associated with large stock price movements in excess of 10% of the value
of the company. These findings suggest that the median voter and the price-
setting shareholder frequently do not have similar valuations for dissident
and management control. When the median shareholder is nearly indiffer-
ent between dissidents and management, the price-setting shareholder often
demonstrates a marked preference for one side versus the other. Moreover,
these differences are not random; the median shareholder values manage-
ment control more than the price-setting shareholder values management
control. When the median shareholder is nearly indifferent, the price-setting
shareholder generally values dissident control as 5–8% more valuable than
management control (see Tables 1, 2 and Figures 3–6).
Prediction 2. If price-setting shareholder valuations are not equivalent
to median voter valuations and the set of close votes has a large intersection
with the set of votes where αI ≈ 0.5, then typical stock price responses
to close votes should be larger than the responses to other votes. Hav-
ing already demonstrated that price-setting shareholder valuations are not
equivalent to median voter valuations, the performance of this prediction
yields information about whether the set of close votes is similar to the set
of votes where αI ≈ 0.5. Figures 3–5 indicate a significant overlap between
these two set of votes. Stock market responses generally have the highest
magnitude in close votes, with the response trending toward zero as the vote
gets progressively more lopsided. This pattern is far from absolute, how-
ever. There are many votes that are decided by reasonably large margins that
witness large stock market reactions. For example, votes where the winning
side gets between 60% and 70% of the vote have stock market responses
that are just as large as votes where the winning side gets less than 60%.
The most accurate characterization of the data is that extremely lopsided
votes are expected and have small stock responses, while votes where the
winning side receives less than 70% often have large stock responses. The
average absolute value of the abnormal return is approximately 1.7% higher







630 American Law and Economics Review V11 N2 2009 (608–635)
for votes where the winning share receives less than 70% compared to votes
where the winning share exceeds 70%.
There are two explanations for the imperfect relationship between the set
of close votes and the set of votes with large stock responses. First, it may
be difficult for shareholders to perfectly prognosticate which votes will be
close. Some votes that were expected to be close will not be, while other
votes will be closer than expected. This effect will cause some dispersion
in the set of votes that have large market responses. Second, if management
has an advantage in close votes, then the set of votes for which αI ≈ 0.5 will
differ from the set of close votes. Some convincing dissident victories may
provide considerable information to the market, because the price-setting
shareholder assumed that a close vote would be won by management.
Prediction 3a. The magnitude of stock market responses to close elections
should be asymmetrical.
Prediction 3b. The asymmetry in responses to management and dissi-
dent victories should be particularly large for votes that are close but not
extremely close.
If management has an advantage in close votes, then the set of votes
for which αI ≈ 0.5 may correspond to cases where management receives
an average voting support of less than 50%, leading to relatively large
stock responses to seemingly decisive dissident victories. Prediction 3a and
3b both receive some support in the data. For votes where the winning side
received less than 70% of the vote, dissident victories had an abnormal return
that was 1.5% greater in magnitude than management victories, supporting
prediction 3a—although the difference is not statistically significant. The
asymmetry between stock price responses for votes that are close but not
extremely close (the winning side received more than 60% but less than 70%)
is even larger. Dissident victories in this range have stock price response
magnitudes that are over 5% larger than management victories between 60%
and 70%, supporting prediction 3b.
7. Conclusion
The results just presented are consistent with, though they do not prove,
several critiques of the corporate voting process. Critics of voting in proxy
contests argue that management enjoys many advantages over dissidents
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including: (i) discretion over the timing of a vote (which is set by manage-
ment); (ii) relationships and contact information for shareholders (dissidents
may have to sue to obtain a list of shareholders, while management has been
in contact with shareholders for an extended period); (iii) unlimited funds
from corporate coffers for soliciting proxies (dissidents are only reimbursed
for proxy expenses when they defeat management); and (iv) the ability
to use financial leverage to influence the vote of institutional shareholder
(management may threaten to withhold business from financial institutions
that vote against them). (Bebchuk, 2007, pp. 688–93). Bebchuk adduces
the small total number of dissident proxy campaigns as empirical evidence
of management’s systematic advantage, but critics (e.g., Macey, 2007) cor-
rectly observe that Bebchuk has no baseline for the “correct” number of
proxy fights. The evidence presented here, by contrast, offers information
aggregation via stock market price setting as a baseline for evaluating the
efficacy of voting.
If management’s campaign advantages alter the opinion of the median
shareholder but have no (or less) impact on the price-setting shareholder,
then the results observed here should follow. Suppose that the median
shareholder and the price-setting shareholder originally share the same opin-
ion, but that management’s advantages are able to “move” the opinion of
the median shareholder in favor of management. (In other words, suppose
that management has a built-in block of votes of a certain percentage).
Thus, a very close shareholder vote means that, absent campaign effects, the
median shareholder preferred the dissident group. The price-setting share-
holder, who by assumption is unmoved by campaign effects, therefore places
greater value on dissident control than on management control whenever the
median voter is indifferent.27 This explains why narrow dissident victories
raise market value, while narrow management wins reduce value.28
27. Even if most of the votes in play in a contested election are voted by hedge funds
that vote to maximize price, different hedge funds may have different opinions about the
direction of the price. With a built-in advantage, management needs to convince fewer
hedge funds and institutions to vote its way. In this case, it is possible that the median
institutional voter votes to maximize value, but that the median institutional voter is
different from the median shareholder voter.
28. The results are also consistent with models of “insincere voting” in corporate law.
That is, voting behavior that differs from an individual shareholder’s private signal about
the merits of management vs. dissidents. See, for example, Gilson and Schwartz (2001),
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Alternatively, some have argued that “empty voting” or decoupling in
corporate elections may adulterate the quality of voting (Martin and Partnoy,
2005; Hu and Black, 2006). Empty voting occurs when shareholders hold
votes without corresponding economic interests. To this point, however, the
extent of empty voting is unknown. The results presented here are consistent
with empty voting. One symptom of empty voting would be a divergence
between the interests of the median voter and price-setting shareholder.
Note, however, that the results presented above are only consistent with a
peculiar form of empty voting in which management takes greater advantage
of the empty voting process than dissidents. To this point, no commentators
have suggested why there might be such an asymmetry.
If either of these interpretations (management advantage or empty vot-
ing) of the data is correct, then several conclusions follow. Shareholder
voting needs reform if its aim is to maximize shareholder value, which
is voting’s purpose according to Easterbrook and Fischel (1983). Reforms
need to equilibrate proxy campaigns so that management cannot unduly
influence shareholder votes. Several reforms, such as dissident proxy
financing, shareholder access to the corporate ballot, and fixed director
election dates, will reduce some of management’s unique campaign-related
advantages that may allow voting outcomes to diverge from value.
This interpretation of the results is plausible, but far from necessary. It
assumes, as do all studies related to the event study methodology, that the
market information aggregation mechanism (with price set by the “price-
setting shareholder”) values companies accurately. This need not be the case.
Instead, corporate voting, using the median shareholder voter’s information
set to make decisions, may aggregate information more efficiently than
the price setting mechanism. In this case, the price-setting shareholder is
wrong, and policymakers should consider reforms to improve the quality of
information aggregation that occurs via price setting.
Whatever the interpretation, one conclusion is clear. Median shareholders
and price-setting shareholders exhibit disparate preferences for management
control relative to dissident control of corporations subject to proxy contests.
Voting and price setting are aggregating information in very different ways.
Goshen (2004), and Feddersen and Pesendorfer (1997). While these models explain why
shareholder voting may not aggregate information so as to maximize shareholder value,
they cannot explain management’s advantage relative to dissidents.
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